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Abstract
This paper deals with the formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of dynamic reconﬁgurations of component-
based systems. To validate such complex systems, there is a need to check model consistency and also
to ensure that dynamic reconﬁgurations satisfy architectural and integrity constraints, invariants, and also
temporal constraints over (re)conﬁguration sequences. As architectural constraints involve ﬁrst-order for-
mulae, and a behavioural semantics of reconﬁgurations gives rise to inﬁnite state systems, we propose to
associate proof and model-checking within the well-established B method, to support the modelling of
such systems and the (partial-)validation of their dynamic reconﬁgurations. The objective of the paper is
twofold. First, given a hierarchical B model of component-based architectures, we validate it by proving its
consistency. Second, given linear temporal logic formulae expressing the desirable dynamic behaviour of the
system, we validate reconﬁgurable system architectures by using bounded model-checking tools supporting
the B method. The main contributions are illustrated on the example of a HTTP server architecture.
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1 Introduction
This article is dedicated to an automatic checking of dynamic reconﬁgurations of
component-based systems whose development provides signiﬁcant advantages like
portability, adaptability, re-usability, etc. Dynamic reconﬁguration of distributed
applications is an active research topic [2,3,17] motivated by practical distributed
applications like, e.g., those modelled in Fractal [9]. In many recent works, the
idea of using temporal logics to specify dynamic reconﬁgurations and to manage
applications at runtime has been explored [7,15,12].
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In [12], a formal semantics of component-based systems architectures with re-
conﬁgurations together with a linear time temporal logic over (re)conﬁguration se-
quences have been proposed. This logic, called FTPL, is based on architectural con-
straints and on event properties. To validate such complex systems, there is a need
to check model consistency and also to ensure that dynamic reconﬁgurations satisfy
architectural and integrity constraints, invariants, and also FTPL constraints. As
these constraints involve ﬁrst-order formulae, and a behavioural semantics of re-
conﬁgurations gives rise to inﬁnite state systems, we propose to combine proof and
model-checking techniques within the well-established B method [1].
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Fig. 1. Principle and contributions
Let us explain our current B-based validation approach and contributions on
Fig. 1. First of all, we propose to model components and basic dynamic reconﬁgura-
tions using the B formal framework. It allows us to deﬁne and to validate a generic
B model for component architectures. We use the AtelierB tool to interactively
prove the architectural constraints consistency (1). Then this generic architecture
is instantiated to represent an architecture under consideration (2); The dynamic
architectural reconﬁgurations are speciﬁed by using the previously deﬁned primi-
tive B operations (3). Note that we do not take into consideration speciﬁcation of
the controller which would use these dynamic reconﬁgurations (through adaptation
policies as instance). Consequently, the validation of the instantiated architectural
model cannot be done using interactive proof. Nevertheless, we perform a partial
validation of these dynamic reconﬁgurations through animations of samples of the
running model, thanks to the ProB model-checker features (4). In addition, tempo-
ral properties over conﬁguration sequences expressed in FTPL are translated into
LTL (5). These properties can be checked with the ProB model-checker (6).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. After giving a motivating
example in Sect. 2, the B method and its tools supports are introduced in Sect. 3. We
formally deﬁne a generic B model of component architectures in Sect. 4. This model
is then instantiated to validate a particular architecture in Sect. 5. To automatically
verify temporal properties, Section 6 introduces FTPL and gives its translation into
LTL. Finally, Section 7 concludes before discussing related work.
2 Motivating Example
To motivate and to illustrate our approach, let us consider an example of an HTTP
server from [10]. The architecture of this server is displayed in Fig. 2.
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The RequestReceiver component reads HTTP requests from the network and
transmits them to the RequestHandler component. In order to keep the response
time as short as possible, RequestHandler can either use a cache (with the com-
ponent CacheHandler) or directly transmit the request to the RequestDispatcher
component. The number of requests (load) and the percentage of similar requests
(deviation) are two parameters deﬁned for the RequestHandler component:
• The CacheHandler component is used only if the number of similar HTTP re-
quests is high.
• The memorySize for the CacheHandler component must depend on the overall
load of the server.
• The validityDuration of data in the cache must also depend on the overall load of
the server.
• The number of used ﬁle servers (like the FileServer1 and FileServer2 components)
used by RequestDispatcher depends on the overall load of the server.
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Fig. 2. HTTP Server architecture
We consider that the HTTP server can be reconﬁgured during the execution by
the following reconﬁguration operations:
(i) AddCacheHandler and RemoveCacheHandler which are respectively used to
add and remove the CacheHandler component when the deviation value in-
creased/decreased around 50;
(ii) AddFileServer and removeFileServer which are respectively used to add and re-
move the FileServer2 component;
(iii) MemorySizeUp and MemorySizeDown which are respectively used to increase
and to decrease the MemorySize value;
(iv) DurationValidityUp and DurationValidityDown to respectively increase and de-
crease the ValidityDuration value.
As an illustration, we specify the AddCacheHandler reconﬁguration expressed in
the FScript language [11]. When the deviation value exceeds 50, the reconﬁgura-
tion consists in instantiating a CacheHandler component. Then, the component
is integrated into the architecture, and the binding with the required interface of
RequestHandler is established. Finally, the component CacheHandler is started.
1 action AddCacheHandler(root)
2 if(value($context/child:∈RequestHandler/attribute:∈deviation) > 50){
3 newCache = new("CacheHandler");
4 add($root, $newCache);
5 bind($root/child:∈RequestHandler/interface:∈getcache, $newCache/interface:∈cache);
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6 start($newCache);
7 }
3 Proof-based Approach: the B Method
B is a formal software development method used to model systems and to reason
about their development [1]. When building a B model, the principle is to express
system properties which are always true after each evolution step of the model,
the evolution being speciﬁed by the B operations. The veriﬁcation of a model
correctness is thus akin to verifying the preservation of these properties, no matter
which step of evolution the system takes.
The B method is based on set theory, relations and ﬁrst-order logic. Constraints
are speciﬁed in the INVARIANT clause of the model, and its evolution is speciﬁed by
the operations in the OPERATIONS clause. Let us assume here that the initialisation is
a special kind of operation. In this setting, the veriﬁcation of a B model consists in
verifying that each operation—assuming its precondition and the invariant hold—
satisﬁes the INVARIANT, i.e. the model is consistent. A strength of the B method is
its stepwise reﬁnement feature: each reﬁnement makes a model more deterministic
and also more precise by introducing programming language-like features.
Tool supports, such as B4free or AtelierB 3 , automatically generate proof obli-
gations (POs) to ensure the consistency in sense of B [1]. Some of them are obvious
POs whereas the other POs have to be proved interactively if it was not done fully
automatically by the diﬀerent provers embedded into AtelierB. Another tool, called
ProB 4 , allows the user to animate B speciﬁcations for their debugging and test-
ing. On the veriﬁcation side, ProB contains a constraint-based checker and a LTL
bounded model-checker with particular features; Both can be used to detect various
errors in B speciﬁcations [18,19].
4 Specifying a General Architectural Model with B
In [12], we have deﬁned a conﬁguration to be a set of architectural elements (com-
ponents, interfaces and parameters) together with a relation to structure and to
link them, through a graph-based representation. The model we have proposed was
inspired by the model in [16,17] given for Fractal. Unlike [16,17], in our model only
the basic and generic concepts are considered to allow their application to vari-
ous hierarchical component models: components as runtime entities, required and
provided interfaces as interaction points between components, bindings to link com-
ponent interfaces. Components are either primitive or composite components. Only
primitive components can have some attributes used as conﬁguration parameters.
Component-based models must provide mechanisms for systems to be dynami-
cally adapted—through their reconﬁgurations—to their environments during their
3 http://www.b4free.com / http://www.atelierb.eu
4 http://www.stups.uni-duesseldorf.de/ProB
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lifetime. These dynamic reconﬁgurations may happen because of architectural mod-
iﬁcations speciﬁed in primitive operations. Notice that reconﬁgurations are not the
only manner to make an architecture evolve. The normal running of diﬀerent com-
ponents also changes the architecture by modifying parameter values or stopping
components, for instance.
In this paper, we give a B speciﬁcation of the generic model for component ar-
chitectures in [12]. Firstly, we express all the architectural constraints between the
architectural elements as B properties and invariants; secondly, we model the prim-
itive reconﬁguration operations as B operations; thirdly, we prove the consistency
of this architectural B model.
4.1 Specifying the Architectural Conﬁgurations with B
The architectural elements we consider are the core entities of a component-based
system: COMPONENTS, INTERFACES, INTERFACE TYPE, and the component PARAMETERS;
and relations over them to express various links between these architectural ele-
ments. Some of these relations do not evolve during the system reconﬁgurations.
They are then deﬁned as B CONSTANTS, and architectural constraints over them are
expressed in the PROPERTIES clause.
SETS
COMPONENTS ; INTERFACES ; INTERFACE TYPE ; PARAMETERS
CONSTANTS
ProvidedInterfaces , RequiredInterfaces , InterfaceType , Provider , Requirer ,
Contingency, Deﬁner
PROPERTIES
ProvidedInterfaces ⊆ INTERFACES
∧ RequiredInterfaces ⊆ INTERFACES
∧ ProvidedInterfaces ∪ RequiredInterfaces = INTERFACES
∧ ProvidedInterfaces ∩ RequiredInterfaces = ∅
∧ InterfaceType ∈ INTERFACES → INTERFACE TYPE
∧ Provider ∈ ProvidedInterfaces → COMPONENTS
∧ Requirer ∈ RequiredInterfaces → COMPONENTS
∧ Contingency ∈ RequiredInterfaces → CONTINGENCY
∧ Deﬁner ∈ PARAMETERS → COMPONENTS
The ProvidedInterfaces and RequiredInterfaces are deﬁned to be subsets of INTERFACES.
Their union is disjunctive. InterfaceType is a total function that associates a type with
each required and provided interface. Provider is a total surjective function which gives
the component having at least a provided interface, whereas Requirer is only a total
function. Contingency is a total function which indicates for each required interface if
it is mandatory or optional. Deﬁner is a total function which gives the component of a
considered parameter.
The other architectural relations we consider may evolve. They are deﬁned as B
VARIABLES, and architectural constraints over them are expressed in the INVARIANT
clause.
VARIABLES
InstantiatedComponents, Parent, Binding, ProvDelegate, ReqDelegate,
State , Value
INVARIANT
InstantiatedComponents ⊆ COMPONENTS
∧ Parent ∈ InstantiatedComponents → InstantiatedComponents
∧ ran(Parent) ∩ ran(Deﬁner) = ∅
∧ closure1(Parent) ∩ id(InstantiatedComponents) = ∅
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InstantiatedComponents is a subset of COMPONENTS. Parent is partial function linking
sub-components to the corresponding composite component. Composite compo-
nents have no parameter, and a sub-component must not be a composite including
its parent component, and so on.
∧ Binding ∈ ProvidedInterfaces → RequiredInterfaces
∧ ∀ ( iprov , ireq ) . ( iprov →ireq ∈ Binding ⇒ (
Provider( iprov ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ Requirer( ireq ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ Provider( iprov ) = Requirer( ireq )
∧ Parent(Provider( iprov )) = Parent(Requirer( ireq ))
∧ InterfaceType( iprov ) = InterfaceType( ireq ) ) )
∧ dom(Binding) ∩ dom(ProvDelegate) = ∅
∧ ran(Binding) ∩ dom(ReqDelegate) = ∅
Binding is a partial function which connects together a provided interface and
a required one: a provided interface can be linked to only one required interface,
whereas a required interface can be the target of more than one provided interface.
Moreover, two linked interfaces do not belong to the same component, but their
corresponding instantiated components are sub-components of the same composite
component. The considered interfaces must have the same interface type, and they
have not yet been involved in a delegation.
∧ ProvDelegate ∈ ProvidedInterfaces  ProvidedInterfaces
∧ ∀ (isub , isuper ) . ( isub → isuper ∈ ProvDelegate ⇒ (
isub = isuper
∧ Provider( isub) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ Provider( isuper ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ Parent(Provider( isub )) = Provider( isuper )
∧ InterfaceType( isub) = InterfaceType( isuper ) ) )
∧ ReqDelegate ∈ RequiredInterfaces  RequiredInterfaces
∧ ∀ (isub , isuper ) . ( isub → isuper ∈ ReqDelegate ⇒ (
isub = isuper
∧ Requirer( isub) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ Requirer( isuper ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ Parent(Requirer( isub )) = Requirer( isuper )
∧ InterfaceType( isub) = InterfaceType( isuper ) ) )
ProvDelegate and ReqDelegate express delegation links and are similarly deﬁned. They
are both partial bijections that associate a provided (resp. required) interface of
a sub-component with a provided (resp. required) interface of its composite: the
parent of the component which provides (resp. requires) isub must be the provider
(res. requirer) of isuper . Finally, both interfaces must have the same type, and they
have not yet been involved in a binding.
∧ State ∈ InstantiatedComponents → STATE
∧ ∀ ( ireq ) . ( ( ireq ∈ RequiredInterfaces
∧ Contingency(ireq) = mandat∨y
∧ Requirer( ireq ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ State(Requirer( ireq )) = started )
⇒ ( ireq ∈ ran(Binding) ∨ ireq ∈ dom(ReqDelegate) ) )
∧ Value ∈ PARAMETERS → INT
State is a total function which associates a value from { started , stopped} with each
instantiated component: a component can be started only if all its mandatory required
interfaces are bound or delegated. Last, Value is a total function which gives the
current value of a considered parameter.
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4.2 Modelling the Dynamic Reconﬁgurations with B
Once a conﬁguration-based model is given, the primitive reconﬁguration operations
can be speciﬁed as B operations of this B model. Namely, we specify:
• instantiate (newComponent) and delete (component) to instantiate/destroy a component;
• add(subComponent,composite) and remove(subComponent) to add/remove sub-components
to/from a composite;
• bind( iprov , ireq ) and unbind(iprov) to bind/unbind component interfaces;
• delegate( isub , isuper ) and undelegate( isub) to delegate/undelegate component interfaces;
• start (component) and stop(component) to start/stop components;
• set(parameter, newValue) to set a new parameter value.
Let us detail some of these B operations. The example below deﬁnes in B the
primitive reconﬁguration operation adding a subcomponent to a composite compo-
nent:
add(subcomponent, composite) =
PRE subcomponent ∈ COMPONENTS ∧ composite ∈ COMPONENTS THEN
SELECT
subcomponent ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ composite ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ subcomponent = composite
∧ composite /∈ ran(Deﬁner)
∧ subcomponent /∈ dom(Parent)
∧ subcomponent →composite /∈ Parent
∧ composite →subcomponent /∈ closure1(Parent)
∧ ∀ ( iprov ) . ( ( iprov ∈ ProvidedInterfaces ∧ Provider( iprov ) = subcomponent )
⇒ ( iprov /∈ dom(Binding) ∧ iprov /∈ dom(ProvDelegate) ) )
∧ ∀ ( ireq ) . ( ( ireq ∈ RequiredInterfaces ∧ Requirer( ireq ) = subcomponent )
⇒ ( ireq /∈ ran(Binding) ∧ ireq /∈ dom(ReqDelegate) ) )
THEN
Parent(subcomponent) := composite
END
END ;
The add(subComponent,composite) operation must establish that the both components
are instantiated components, composite is a composite component (i.e. a component
without parameters). Moreover, subComponent is not a sub-component of another
composite nor is already used: none of its interfaces is bound or delegated. Finally,
the modiﬁcation does not introduce a cycle into Parent.
bind( iprov , ireq ) =
PRE iprov ∈ INTERFACES ∧ ireq ∈ INTERFACES THEN
SELECT
iprov ∈ ProvidedInterfaces
∧ ireq ∈ RequiredInterfaces
∧ Provider( iprov ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ Requirer( ireq ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ iprov /∈ dom(Binding)
∧ iprov /∈ dom(ProvDelegate)
∧ ireq /∈ dom(ReqDelegate)
∧ InterfaceType( iprov ) = InterfaceType( ireq )
∧ iprov →ireq /∈ Binding
THEN
Binding( iprov ) := ireq
END
END ;
The binding of component
interfaces is expressed by
bind( iprov , ireq ): this operation
must establish that the con-
sidered interfaces are correct,
i.e. they are provided (resp.
required) interfaces of instan-
tiated components, they are
not bound nor delegated, and
their types are compatible.
Furthermore, the binding has
not been done yet.
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unbind(iprov) =
PRE iprov ∈ INTERFACES THEN
SELECT
iprov ∈ ProvidedInterfaces
∧ Provider( iprov ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ State(Provider( iprov )) = stopped
∧ ∃ ( ireq ) . (
ireq ∈ RequiredInterfaces
∧ Requirer( ireq ) ∈ InstantiatedComponents
∧ State(Requirer( ireq )) = stopped
∧ iprov = ireq
∧ InterfaceType( iprov ) = InterfaceType( ireq )
∧ iprov →ireq ∈ Binding )
THEN
Binding := {iprov} − Binding
END
END ;
The unbinding primitive opera-
tion is speciﬁed as follows: this
operation expresses as precon-
dition that the considered inter-
face is provided by an instanti-
ated component. This provider
must be stopped. Moreover, a re-
quired interface bound with the
considered interface, must exist.
Then, the considered interface
is removed from Binding.
stop(component) =
PRE component ∈ COMPONENTS THEN
SELECT
component ∈ InstantiatedComponents ∧ State(component) = started
THEN
State := State − ({component} ∪ dom(closure1(Parent)  {component})) × {stopped}
END
END ;
When considering a started component, applying stop(component) changes to stopped the
state of the considered component and the states of all its sub-components, if they
exist; and so on.
Once these primitive reconﬁguration operations are speciﬁed, more complex re-
conﬁguration operations can be written, as explained in Sect. 2.
4.3 Validating the Architectural B Model
We use AtelierB to validate the consistency of our generic B model for component
architectures. The tool generates proof obligations (POs) to check the consistency
of all the architectural constraints expressed in the INVARIANT and the fact that each
B reconﬁguration operation respects these architectural constraints.
PO Proved Unproved %
(closure1()) proved
Initialisation 30 30 0 100
instantiate 20 18 2 (1) 90
delete 27 21 6 77
add 18 14 4 (3) 77
remove 18 17 1 (1) 94
bind 9 4 5 44
unbind 9 8 1 88
start 3 0 3 (3) 0
stop 3 0 3 (3) 0
set 2 2 0 100
TOTAL 139 114 25 (11) 82
The AtelierB generates 139 POs. No-
tice that the work on POs is in progress:
at this time, 114 of them are automat-
ically or interactively discharged. The
proof of 25 POs remains to be done.
That does not mean that they are false, but that the AtelierB provers simply
don’t succeed in demonstrating the rule: it may be due to the fact that some B
operators are not handled in an eﬃcient manner by the provers (like closure1 (), for
11 unproved POs), or due to the fact that the heuristics used for the proof are not
eﬃcient enough in this case. An eﬀort remains to be done to manually demonstrate
the unproved POs.
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5 Validating a Speciﬁc Architecture
As summarized in Fig. 1, our approach consists in instantiating the generic ar-
chitectural B model to specify and to verify a particular architecture. Primitive
reconﬁguration operations are used to give the complex reconﬁguration operations
corresponding to the running example.
As explained in Section 1, the instanciation of the general model cannot be
checked with the proof approach. Indeed, we don’t consider any speciﬁcation of
the controller to manage the dynamic reconﬁgurations. Nevertheless, to partially
validate the model, we apply bounded model-checking to validate the instantiated
model.
5.1 Instantiating a Running Architecture
To instantiate a speciﬁc architecture using the generic B model, we just give values
to all the previously deﬁned sets, constants and variables in Subsect. 4.1, to make
them represent the running architecture.
Let us now specify the diﬀerent manipulated basic architectural elements corre-
sponding to the HTTP server example:
COMPONENTS = { HttpServer, RequestReceiver, RequestHandler, CacheHandler,
RequestDispatcher, FileServer1 , FileServer2 } ;
INTERFACES = { httpRequest, request, getHandler, handler , getDispatcher ,
getCache, cache, dispatcher , getServer , server1 , server2} ;
INTERFACE TYPE = { Trequest, Thandler, Tdispatcher, Tcache, Tserver} ;
PARAMETERS = { deviation, load, validityDuration , mem∨ySize }
The PROPERTIES clause is extended to state values of the architectural relations:
∧ ProvidedInterfaces = { httpRequest,request , handler ,cache, dispatcher , server1 , server2 }
∧ RequiredInterfaces = { getHandler, getDispatcher , getCache, getServer }
∧ Contingency = { getHandler →mandat∨y, getDispatcher →mandat∨y,
getCache →optional, getServer →mandat∨y }
∧ InterfaceType = { httpRequest →Trequest, request →Trequest, handler →Thandler,
getHandler →Thandler, getDispatcher →Tdispatcher,
getCache →Tcache, cache →Tcache, dispatcher →Tdispatcher,
getServer →Tserver, server1 →Tserver, server2 →Tserver}
∧ Provider = { httpRequest →HttpServer, request →RequestReceiver,
handler →RequestHandler, cache→CacheHandler, server1→FileServer1,
dispatcher →RequestDispatcher, server2 →FileServer2 }
∧ Requirer = { getHandler →RequestReceiver, getDispatcher →RequestHandler,
getCache →RequestHandler, getServer →RequestDispatcher }
∧ Deﬁner = { deviation →RequestHandler, load →RequestHandler,
validityDuration →CacheHandler, mem∨ySize →CacheHandler }
Finally, we initialise the remaining architectural relations as follows:
∧ InitComponents = { HttpServer, RequestReceiver, RequestHandler, FileServer1 ,
RequestDispatcher}
∧ InitParent = { RequestReceiver →HttpServer, RequestHandler →HttpServer,
RequestDispatcher →HttpServer, FileServer1 →HttpServer }
∧ InitBinding = { handler →getHandler, dispatcher →getDispatcher,
server1 →getServer }
∧ InitProvDelegate = { request →httpRequest }
∧ InitReqDelegate = ∅
∧ InitState = { HttpServer →started, RequestReceiver →started,
RequestHandler →started, RequestDispatcher →stopped,
FileServer1 →stopped }
∧ InitValue = { deviation →49, load →75, validityDuration →2, mem∨ySize →100 }
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5.2 Modelling the Running Reconﬁgurations with B
After having speciﬁed the primitive reconﬁgurations in Subsect. 4.2, we can write
more complex reconﬁguration operations calling the primitive ones, by composing
them sequentially and by using SELECT, IF and/or WHILE statements.
AddCacheHandler =
SELECT (Value(deviation) > 50)
THEN
instantiate (CacheHandler) ;
add(CacheHandler, HttpServer) ;
bind(cache, getCache) ;
start (CacheHandler)
END ;
The AddCacheHandler reconﬁguration from
Sec. 2 can be expressed using the B reconﬁgu-
ration primitives as depicted here. All the re-
conﬁgurations of the running example can be
expressed by B operations in a similar man-
ner.
In addition, the normal running of diﬀerent components could also change the
architecture by modifying, for example, parameter values. To handle this behaviour,
a solution would be to deﬁne an abstraction of the running of the system as a (set
of) B operation(s). For our example, a B operation, called RUN, is added: basically,
it changes the values of the (load) and (deviation) parameters of the RequestHandler
component.
5.3 Validating the Running Architectural B Model
Addressing the validation of the instantiated B model using a proof process is not
possible at this step of the work. Indeed, we have not taken into consideration
a speciﬁcation of the necessary associated controller to manage dynamic recon-
ﬁgurations (by the mean of adaptation policies, as instance). Then, there is no
information about the context where the reconﬁguration operations are called. The
AtelierB cannot be used to verify the instantiated model because its provers have no
hypothesis to help them to prove that the reconﬁgurations preserve the architectural
invariant.
Nevertheless, in order to (partially) validate the instantiated B model, ProB
can be used to check the consistency of samples of the instantiated B model: at
each reconﬁguration step, ProB checks the architectural constraints to ﬁnd an ex-
ample violating the invariant. It is therefore possible to produce traces containing
sequences of running and reconﬁguration operations.
A. Lanoix et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 279 (2) (2011) 43–5752
For example, it is easy to reproduce this short scenario (the right-
side ﬁgure depicts the corresponding trace generated by ProB):
(i) The initial conﬁguration of the HTTP server is without the
CacheHandler and FileServer2 components;
(ii) Next conﬁguration is obtained by running the architecture
and changing the load and deviation values;
(iii) At this stage, we add CacheHandler to the global architec-
ture, following the AddCacheHandler reconﬁguration opera-
tion;
(iv) After that the FileServer2 component is added to the archi-
tecture, through the AddFileServer reconﬁguration;
(v) The architecture is running;
(vi) By applying the RemoveCacheHandler reconﬁguration, the
component CacheHandler is deleted from the global archi-
tecture.
Automatic random explorations allow us to check the instantiated
B model in a more general manner. As example, ProB model-
checks 1000 nodes into 5301 milliseconds: neither invariant viola-
tion nor deadlock was found, and all the operations were covered.
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6 Checking Temporal Formulae over Reconﬁgurations
In this section, we exploit the linear temporal logic for dynamic reconﬁgurations
introduced in [12] and called FTPL. It allows us to characterise the correct be-
haviour of reconﬁguration-based systems by using architectural invariants and lin-
ear temporal logic patterns. FTPL has been inspired by proposals in [13], and their
temporal extensions for JML [21,8,14]. In this work, we propose to translate the
FTPL patterns into LTL formulae in order to check FTPL properties with the ProB
model-checker.
6.1 FTPL Syntax and Semantics
Let us consider the subset of FTPL in the ﬁgure below. It is based on trace prop-
erties, each of them being a temporal constraint on (a part of) the execution of the
dynamic reconﬁguration model. The conﬁguration properties, called conf , are ﬁrst
order logic formulae over sets and relational operations on the primitive sets and
over relations deﬁned in Sect. 4.1. Further, for a reconﬁguration operation ope, its
ending is considered as an event.
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event ::= ope terminates
trace ::= always conf
| eventually conf
| trace1 ∧ trace2
| trace1 ∨ trace2
temp ::= after event temp
| before event trace
| trace until event
| between event1 event2 trace
The trace properties specify the constraints
to ensure on a sequence of reconﬁgurations.
We mainly specify the always and eventu-
ally constraints which respectively describe
that a property has to be satisﬁed by every
conﬁguration of the sequence, or by at least
one conﬁguration of the sequence.
Every temporal formula concerns a part of the execution trace on which the
property should hold: it is speciﬁed with special keywords, like e.g., after/before
a particular event has happened, or between two particular events.
Let us now illustrate the FTPL language by expressing some properties on the
example of the HTTP server from Sect. 2.
Example 1 The following property expresses an architectural constraint saying that
always there is at least one ﬁle server. In other words, always there is at least
one provided interface connected to the required interface getServer of RequestDis-
patcher:
always ∃ iprov ∈ ProvidedInterfaces. Binding(iprov) = getServer
Example 2 The reconﬁguration AddCacheHandler (resp. RemoveCacheHandler)
adds (resp. removes) CacheHandler when the deviation value is greater (resp. less)
than 50. The following property speciﬁes that the deviation value eventually becomes
less than 50 between the considered reconﬁgurations:
between AddCacheHandler terminates
RemoveCacheHandler terminates eventually deviation < 50
These examples show that FTPL is more expressive than the proposals in [11],
which only handle architectural invariants. Indeed, FTPL allows expressing event
properties and temporal properties involving diﬀerent kinds of temporal patterns
which have been shown useful for practical applications [13].
6.2 From FTPL to LTL
We adapt the results in [21] and [8] and propose a translation of FTPL patterns into
the LTL dialect considered by ProB, called LTL[e] [19]. The translation procedure,
denoted LTL(x), is inductively deﬁned on the structure of the FTPL formula.
Let conf be a conﬁguration prop-
erty, B(conf) a rewriting proce-
dure giving the B predicate corre-
sponding to conf , and ope a recon-
ﬁguration.
LTL(conf) {B(conf)}
LTL(ope terminates) [ope]
LTL(always conf) G(LTL(conf))
LTL(eventually conf) F(LTL(conf))
LTL(trace1 ∧ trace2) LTL(trace1) ∧ LTL(trace2)
LTL(trace1 ∨ trace2) LTL(trace1) ∨ LTL(trace2)
Let trace, trace1 and trace2 be trace properties, event an event property, and
temp a temporal property. Remark that a trace property is translated into LTL
according to the temporal context in which the property is used, that is why we
deﬁne an auxiliary functions LTLB.
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LTL(after event temp) G(LTL(event) ⇒ LTL(temp))
LTL(after event trace) G(LTL(event) ⇒ LTL(trace))
LTL(before event trace) F(LTL(event)) ⇒ LTLB(event, trace)
LTL(trace until event) F(LTL(event)) ∧ LTLB(event, trace)
LTLB(event, always conf) LTL(conf) U LTL(event)
LTLB(event, eventually conf) ¬(¬(LTL(conf)) U LTL(event))
LTL(between event1 event2 trace) LTL(after event1 (trace until event2))
The FTPL property presented in Example 1 has been translated into the LTL
formula below. This formula has been partially checked with ProB in 126 millisec-
onds. The model checker generates 2002 atoms and 16064 transitions when the
maximum number of new states is 1000.
G( { ∃(iprov) . ( iprov ∈ ProvidedInterfaces ∧ Binding(iprov) = getServer) } )
Applying the above translation to the property in Example 2 results in the LTL
property below, checked in 1802 milliseconds. The model checker generates 16048
atoms and 129704 transitions when the maximum number of new states is 1000.
G( [AddCacheHandler] ⇒
F([RemoveCacheHandler]) ∧ ¬(¬({Value(deviation) < 50}) U [RemoveCacheHandler]) )
More sophisticated temporal properties involving architectural constraints can
be written thanks to FTPL [12]. Then, thanks to our translation procedure,
their veriﬁcation can be investigated with ProB. Note that this veriﬁcation is size-
bounded and partial because of ProB features.
7 Conclusion
The diﬀerent proposals presented in this paper concern the veriﬁcation of dy-
namic reconﬁgurations of concurrent component-based systems. Dynamic archi-
tectural constraints could be expressed with a linear time temporal logic over
(re)conﬁguration sequences, as FTPL [12]. As architectural constraints involve ﬁrst-
order formulae, and a behavioural semantics of reconﬁgurations gives rise to inﬁnite
state systems, we have proposed an approach combining proof and model-checking
to support the modelling of such systems and the validation of their dynamic re-
conﬁgurations, as depicted Fig. 1. We ﬁrst have proposed a generic B model for
component architectures and we have proved the consistency of the model archi-
tectural constraints. Then, we have instantiated the general model to address a
particular architecture validation: its consistency and some temporal properties
over (re-)conﬁguration sequences—expressed in FTPL and translated into LTL—
have been model-checked.
Our contributions for temporal properties speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation—
including static and dynamic analysis—allow monitoring instrumentation and man-
aging applications at runtime, thanks to available tools to animate speciﬁcations.
Related work. In the context of dynamic reconﬁgurations, ArchJava [4] gives
means to reconﬁgure Java architectures, and the ArchJava language guarantees
communication integrity at run-time. Barringer et al. give a temporal logic based
framework to reason about the evolution of systems [6]. In [5], a temporal logic is
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proposed to specify and verify properties on graph transformation systems.
In the Fractal-based framework, the work in [17] has deﬁned integrity constraints
on a graph-based representation of Fractal, to specify the reliability of component-
based systems. Unlike [17], our model lays down only general architectural con-
straints, thus providing an operational semantics to other component-based systems.
On the integrity constraints side, the FTPL logic allows specifying architectural
constraints more complex than architectural invariants in [11].
To enforce software robustness while adding adaptive behaviour, the work in [20]
proposes a formal framework for the Fractal component model, named FracL. Like
our B-based proposal, the FracL static approach allows verifying the consistency
of the application architecture. However, our proposal allows checking the model
consistency and monitoring temporal properties, both fully automatically.
Among other applications, our proposals aim at a monitoring of component-
based systems. In [7], Basin et.al have shown the feasibility of monitoring temporal
safety properties (and, more recently, security properties) using a runtime moni-
toring approach for metric First-order temporal logic (MFOTL). Like the model
in [7], our model is a ﬁrst-order structure, but instead of considering a sequence of
time stamps, we focus on reconﬁguration operations. In [15], knowledge-based con-
trollability is studied for constructing distributed controllers. The problem there is
somewhat diﬀerent than ours: the goal is to make the system behave exactly accord-
ing to a given knowledge-based priority property, while here the reconﬁgurations
must satisfy some given architectural and temporal constraints.
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